No Blood For Cocoa

7:25 am, 11/22/04

No Blood For Cocoa
Jeremy Levitt, writing in the Chicago Sun-Times, explains just how wrong the French mission to Ivory Coast really is.

Once one of Africa's most stable countries, the former French colony has been embroiled in civil conflict since it was destabilized by a coup d'etat in December 1999. Since then it has been besieged by civil conflict, broken peace deals, fledging elections, national xenophobia, failed national reconciliation processes, economic stagnation and full-blown civil war.

International peace efforts culminated in the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement in January 2003. The agreement called for a government of national reconciliation, including new elections, restructuring of the military, disarmament of all armed groups and respect for human rights.

On Nov. 4, the Ivorian government arguably violated an earlier cease-fire agreement by bombing rebel positions in the French patrolled Zone of Confidence separating the rebel north and loyalist south. It is rumored that the bombings were precipitated by rebel movements and the failure of the latter to disarm.

On Nov. 6, France became a party to the conflict by destroying at least two military aircraft in the tiny Ivorian air force in response to an alleged friendly fire incident in which government fighter jets bombed a French military encampment while attacking rebel positions in the northern town of Bouake, the rebel stronghold, killing nine French soldiers and one American civilian.

To be fair, I'd hardly call it a "friendly fire" incident. The Ivorians generally believe that the French are on the rebels' side, and, considering they their primary mission appears to be to force a democratic government to share power with roving bands of thugs, that's pretty reasonable.

Under traditional international law, peacekeeping forces are supposed to be impartial, lightly armed, not to use force except in self-defense and function with the consent of the host state. From this background, the French bombing of the Ivorian air force would be illegal and in breach of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibiting states to attack one another unless in self-defense. France was also obligated to adhere to the principles of impartiality and proportionality and prevailing U.N. Charter law prohibitions on uses of force. Notwithstanding, the traditional law of peacekeeping is blurred when states undertake U.N.-authorized enforcement actions. Nonetheless, France's enforcement power is limited to the operational mandate of the UNOCI, which does not permit reprisals for negligent bombing or the breaching of the cease-fire agreement. Reprisals of this sort are not permitted under international law or by any of the agreements/resolutions controlling this conflict. Because France was operating under a U.N. mandate, it should have formally complained about the bombing to the U.N. before acting as judge and executioner.

Unilateralism? Say it ain't so.

French action triggered anti-foreigner violence, heated an arguably simmering xenophobic political culture forcing cores of expatriates to flee the country. It also entrenched political rifts between the rebels and loyalist forces.

Last week, the U.N. Security Council adopted a French-sponsored Resolution 1572, which condemned the Ivorian air strikes and fully supported the retaliatory actions of French forces. The resolution demands that Ivorian authorities cease all radio and television broadcasts inciting hatred, intolerance and violence and, most important, levies an arms embargo on the country. It also promises targeted economic and travel sanctions on anyone who threatens peace and national reconciliation processes.

The U.N. is setting a dangerous precedent by sanctioning France's actions and levying sanctions against Ivory Coast. Let us hope that this rush to judgment and levying of sanctions does not result in mass warfare in the country.

What the French have essentially done is declared war on the Ivory Coast, and called it "peacekeeping" to set up an adorable little fief. Issues of "international law" aside, the fact is that whether or not they're technically able to do this or not, they're on the wrong side. Common sense can tell any observer that a popular government has not just a right but an obligation to resist violent overthrow. The French instead came there to aid overthrow. The rebel-typse have staged one failed coup or assassination attempt after another, and having no luck there, turned to the French. This appears to be making progress, since in light of the chaos the French have brought to the country, there are now calls from Senegal to suspend elections and replace the government with a "non-political" transitional government that would rule for 3-5 years. I think we know what that government would look like.

Meanwhile, the Paris-based International Herald Tribune says Gbagbo is "tearing the country apart" by opposing the French.

What did the French think the Ivorians would do when they summarilly obliterated their air force? Buy them hookers? Do a Rodgers & Hammerstein number in the street? Of course they're angry.

It's worth noting, too, that France isn't "just now" causing problems. Their mission to Ivory Coast is an undiluted failure. Even a year ago, the UN already reported that disease was skyrocketing, 600,000 people had been displaced, and that 50,000 Ivorians (along with 300,000 immigrant workers) had fled the country. Indeed, it appears that another 19,000 have fled to Liberia, and the UN is shipped 20 tons of food to the border town of Butuo in the hopes they won't starve to death.

Exactly how many people have fled Iraq and Afghanistan for their lives in recent years? Hint: Of those displaced by Saddam and the Taliban, refugees are moving back to Iraq and Afghanistan by the millions. Everybody, on all sides of the debate, can agree that a situation that the locals quantifiably consider worse than their Iraqi counterparts is not, as the French claim, a "remarkable success". (Indeed, if we were half as bungling in Iraq as the left paints us to be, wouldn't that make France's mission "a remarkable failure"? If I wanted to take this to it's extreme conclusion, I could say that this may mean French "peacekeeping" is about as desirable as rule by the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. I could, but I won't.)

In the same article where he outlined some of France's miserable failure a year ago, Denis Boyles outlined a theory for what might motivate France:

For one thing, France has a huge and growing Muslim population, and they're all on the side of the rebels - as the government discovered when it tried to arrest some of the rebel leaders in Paris, only to release them when Muslims in both Paris and the northern districts of Ivory Coast squawked.

It's hardly a new idea that France's foreign policy is manipulated by their fear of Islamist reprisal.

The French fiction is that they are working with the rebels and the government to move the country back to a minimum of security, but in fact the government in Ivory Coast is make-believe. Bremer's Iraqi governing council is the Court of the Sun King in comparison. Even Europe 1's Elkabbach had to ask, "If the French army leaves the Ivory Coast, how many minutes will the government survive?" The question sent Villepin into a fit of turbocharged platitudes.

Then, earlier this week, the rebel factions with whom France was supposed to be working had a falling out and, according to this report in Liberation, 23 people were killed in a provincial center when one group of rebels stormed a bank and others tried to move in on them. Le Monde carried the news that the incident might even cause France to consider peacekeeping in places where there is no peace.

If it had been a GI tripping over a landmine in Baghdad, it would be a "spiral of violence and terrorism." But where all you have is a Reuters and an AFP guy bumping into each other on a dash for cover, it's just another day in what Villepin called "the spirit of the Marcoussis accords." By "spirit" he means "ghost," because if last month was any indication, the U.N.'s mission in Ivory Coast is dead.

That was a year ago. The mission, like Generalisimo Franco, is still dead.

Advocates of the French mission believe that the minute France leaves, the Muslim north and Christian south may engage in a blood feud that will make Rwanda seem quaint. That's a valid concern, but it's also worth considering that the "peacekeeping" presence already appears to be all but non-existant outside Abidjan. Of course, also important to consider is who is factually in the right here, and whose side France has chosen to take. Other countries may have to step in to help the government reestablish order and the rule of law in the absence of French troops, as clearly, something needs to be done in Ivory Coast to ensure a long term solution and help stabilize the country again. What's also clear is that the French have no interest in doing it: Their agenda is their own.